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Abstract
This Article examines whether there should be exceptions to the
international exclusionary rule for evidence obtained by torture, and if
so, how those exceptions should be crafted to avoid abuse. Rather than
explore the question in the hotly debated milieu of terrorist prosecutions,
this Article analyzes and critiques three possible exceptions to the torture
evidence exclusionary rule in the context of whether the newly
established U.N. Cambodia Genocide Tribunal should admit evidence of
the Khmer Rouge command structure that came from interrogation
sessions at the infamous Tuol Sleng torture facility: (1) that the
exclusionary rule should not apply to evidence resulting from
preliminary questioning before the application of actual torture; (2) that
the exclusionary rule should not apply to evidence obtained by third-
party authorities; and (3) that the exclusionary rule should not apply to
evidence used against the leaders of the regime who were ultimately
responsible for the acts of torture.
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It is one thing to condemn torture, as we all do. It is another to find a solution to
the question that this case raises which occupies the moral high ground but at the
same time serves the public interest and is practicable. Condemnation is easy.
Finding a solution to the question is much more difficult.
Lord Hope of Craighead,
British House of Lords, 20051
1. A & Others v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't [2005] UKHL 71, [2006] 2 A.C.
221, 100 (appeal taken from E.W.C.A.) (U.K.), available at http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/idjudgmt/jd05 1208/aand.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2008).
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L Introduction
This Article examines whether there should be expanded exceptions to the
torture evidence exclusionary rule, and if so, how those exceptions should be
crafted to avoid abuse. Rather than explore the question in the hotly debated
context of terrorist prosecutions, this Article uses a very different kind of case
study which presents the issue in a fresh light that challenges the general
assumptions about the morality, efficacy, and legality of admitting evidence
obtained by torture.
In October 2006, the author of this Article was invited to help lead the first
training session for the investigative judges and prosecutors of the United
Nations' newly established Cambodia Genocide Tribunal, known as the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.2 One of the most
contentious issues that arose during the session was the question of whether the
Cambodia Tribunal could admit evidence of the Khmer Rouge command
structure that came from interrogation sessions at the infamous Toul Sleng
torture facility. What makes the issue novel is that the evidence the Tribunal is
interested in is not the substance of the victims' torture-induced confessions but
the background biographical information provided by the victims at the start of,
or just prior to their interrogation, such as the location and type of work they
did for the regime, as well as the names and the responsibilities of their
superiors and subordinates.
While in Phnom Penh, this author was given a tour of the Tuol Sleng
facility, which has been maintained by the Cambodian government as a
memorial exactly as it was the day the Khmer Rouge regime fell in January
1979. Each dank room at Tuol Sleng contains a rusty metal bed frame with
large manacles and assorted implements of torment, under which can be seen
the faded brownish stain from pools of blood, and above which hang large
black and white photos of the anguished faces and broken bodies of the last
occupants of that room the day the facility was liberated by the Vietnamese
2. After the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime was toppled by Vietnam in 1979, efforts to
bring the Khmer Rouge to justice were largely dormant until the 1990s. From 1997 to 2004, the
United Nations and the government of Cambodia undertook a series of negotiations, which
ultimately resulted in the establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia. This hybrid tribunal, with jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, grave breaches
of the Geneva Conventions, and crimes against humanity, was composed of a mix of Cambodian
and internationally appointed judges, prosecutors, and staff. See generally Daniel Kemper
Donovan, Joint UN.-Cambodia Efforts to Establish a Khmer Rouge Tribunal, 44 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 551 (2003); Daryl A. Mundis, New Mechanisms for the Enforcement of International
Humanitarian Law, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 934, 939-42 (2001). The Tribunal's constituent
instruments, including its Statute, Agreement with the United Nations, and Internal Rules, are
available at its website: http://www.eccc.gov.kh.
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army. Over 17,000 people are documented to have entered Tuol Sleng for
interrogation; only six are known to have survived.3
At first blush, the Tuol Sleng interrogation statements would seem plainly
to be barred by the international exclusionary rule, contained in Article 15 of
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment.4 Article 15 of the Torture Convention provides:
"Each State Party shall ensure that any statement which is established to have
been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any
proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the
statement was made."
5
The problem for the Cambodia Tribunal is that the Tuol Sleng evidence is
believed to be critical to proving command responsibility6 and/orjoint criminal
enterprise liability7 of the half-dozen Khmer Rouge leaders being tried by the
Tribunal. In addition, the evidence will be needed to prove that the defendants
meet the Tribunal's jurisdictional requirement, which limits prosecution to
"senior leaders" and "those who were most responsible."8  Under these
3. Donovan, supra note 2, at 551 n.1.
4. See generally Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art. 15, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465
U.N.T.S. 113 [hereinafter Torture Convention].
5. Id.
6. Under the doctrine of command responsibility, a military commander or civilian
official, who has de jure or de facto control over subordinates, can be held responsible for the
crimes committed by those subordinates if the commander/official "knew or had reason to know
that [a crime] was about to be or had been committed" and did not take "reasonable measures to
prevent [the crime] or punish the perpetrator[s]." Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-2 l-T,
Judgment, 346 (Nov. 16, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/triac2/judgement
(last visited Jan. 6, 2008); see generally Greg R. Vetter, Command Responsibility of Non-
Military Superiors in the International Criminal Court (ICC), 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 89 (2000).
7. Somewhat similar to the American concepts of conspiracy and felony murder, under
the international law doctrine of joint criminal enterprise, a defendant can be held criminally
liable for the crimes of others acting pursuant to a common design or plan. For a thorough
discussion and critique of the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise, see generally Allison
Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise,
Command Responsibility, and the Development ofInternational Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV.
75 (2005).
8. Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers art. 1, NS/RKM/1004/006
(2004) (Cambodia), available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/law/4/KR law
asamended 27 Oct 2004 eng.pdf(last visited Jan. 25, 2008). In reviewing its own statute,
the Special Court for Sierra Leone interpreted the similar phrase "persons who bear the greatest
responsibility" as not merely a guide for the exercise of the prosecutor's discretion, but rather as
a jurisdictional hurdle that the prosecutor must prove to the satisfaction of the Tribunal. See
Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on Defence Motion on the Lack of
Personal Jurisdiction, 27 (Mar. 3, 2004).
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circumstances, must the international rule excluding admission of torture
evidence be mechanically applied, with the result that the prosecution of those
responsible for mass torture in Cambodia will be frustrated, or does some
principled argument exist under which the evidence can be admitted in
harmony with international law?
In addressing this question, this Article begins by setting out the history
and policies behind the international exclusionary rule for torture evidence and
provides background about the importance of the Tuol Sleng evidence to the
Cambodia Tribunal prosecutions. This is followed by an analysis and critique
of three possible arguments for admission of the evidence: (1) that evidence
resulting from preliminary questioning before the application of actual torture is
not covered by the torture evidence exclusionary rule; (2) that the torture
evidence exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained by third-party
authorities; and (3) that under canons of statutory construction and principles of
treaty interpretation, the exception contained in Article 15 of the Torture
Convention should be interpreted broadly to apply to evidence used against the
superiors of the perpetrators as well as the perpetrators themselves, so as not to
undermine the object, purpose, and spirit of the Convention. The concluding
Part cautions that there are potentially significant negative long-term
consequences that flow from judicial application of these arguments and, to
minimize these, proposes specific criteria that a court should employ before
admitting torture evidence in such a case.
II. Background
A. History of the Torture Evidence Exclusionary Rule
There was a time when evidence obtained by torture was not barred, but
rather specifically authorized to be used in judicial proceedings. For example,
400 years ago, when Guy Fawkes was arrested as he was preparing to blow up
the British Parliament building,9 King James I sent orders authorizing torture to
be used to persuade Fawkes to confess and reveal the names of his co-
conspirators.' 0 The King's order stated that "the gentlest tortures" were first to
be employed and that his torturers were then to proceed to the worst until the
9. DONALD CARSWELL, TRIAL OF GuY FAWKES AND OTHERS (THE GUNPOWDER PLOT) 23-
37 (1934).
10. 2 LuKE OWEN PIKE, A HISTORY OF CRIME IN ENGLAND 120 (1876); J.W. WILLs-BUND,
TRIALS FOR TREASON (1327-1660), at 373 (1879).
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information was extracted from Fawkes." Shortly thereafter, Fawkes signed a
confession and provided the names of seven co-conspirators, all of whom were
convicted on the basis of Fawkes' torture-induced confession.12
Although England banned the practice of relying on torture evidence in
British trials in 1640 when the Star Chamber was abolished,' 3 the admission of
coerced confessions, including those elicited by violent means, was authorized
for use in the special "Diplock Courts" employed by British authorities in
terrorism trials in Northern Ireland as late as the 1980s.14 In the United States,
during the twentieth century, Supreme Court precedent gradually expanded the
exclusionary rule to prohibit confessions elicited by means of torture.' 5
However, like the British Diplock Courts, in 2006, the United States created an
exception for evidence extracted under "cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment" used in military commissions to prosecute members of the al Qaeda
terrorist organization interned in the detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay.1
6
In an effort to eliminate world-wide use of torture, the members of the
United Nations negotiated the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which was adopted in 1984
and entered into force on June 26, 1987. 17 Today, this is one of the most
11. PIKE,supra note 10, at 120.
12. CARSWELL, supra note 9, at 39-42, 90-92.
13. 5 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 185-87, 194-95 (3d ed. 1945).
14. Michael P. Scharf, Foreign Courts on Trial: Why US. Courts ShouldAvoidApplying
the Inquiry Provision of the Supplementary US.-UK Extradition Treaty, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L.
257, 264 n.34, 278-79 (1989).
15. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936),
confessions were admissible at trial without any restriction; even a statement obtained by torture
was not excluded. In Brown, a confession obtained by brutally beating the suspect was struck
down on the ground that interrogation is part of the process by which a state procures a
conviction and thus is subject to the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause. Id. at 286.
16. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C.S. § 948r (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp.
2007). While evidence from torture is prohibited, the statute permits evidence derived from
"cruel, inhuman, or degrading" techniques, provided that the statement was obtained prior to
December 30, 2005, that a military judge finds the statement to be "reliable," and that the
statement's admission would serve "the interests ofjustice." Id. § 948r(b)-(d); see also Michael
P. Scharf, Professor of Law, Case W. Reserve Univ. Sch. of Law, Prepared Statement Before the
House Armed Services Committee Hearing on Standards of Military Commissions and
Tribunals (July 26, 2006), http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/publications/testimony (last
visited Jan. 7, 2008) (criticizing the testimony of Steven Bradbury, acting Assistant Attorney
General and head of the Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, who asserted that it
was necessary to use evidence extracted using a variety of coercive techniques, including water
boarding) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
17. Torture Convention, supra note 4, at 113 n.1.
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widely ratified of multilateral treaties, with 145 parties, including Cambodia.
18
Article 15 of the Torture Convention contains the first international codification
of the exclusionary rule for evidence obtained by torture. No state party has
made a reservation to Article 15.19
In 1992, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture, Peter Koojimans, in his
report to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, explained the rationale for
the exclusionary rule, observing that judicial acceptance of statements obtained
under torture was "responsible for the flourishing of torture" and that the
exclusion of such evidence would "make torture unrewarding and therefore
unattractive." 20  In addition to the public policy objective of removing any
incentive to undertake torture anywhere in the world, the exclusionary rule has
been justified on the basis of the unreliability of evidence obtained as a result of
torture and on the need to preserve the integrity of the judicial process.21
Unlike the rulings of other international and hybrid tribunals, 22 the Internal
Rules of the Cambodia Tribunal do not contain an exclusionary rule mirroring
Article 15 of the Torture Convention.23 Even though Cambodia is a party to the
Torture Convention, the hybrid Tribunal, as a separate legal personality, is not
itself bound by the treaties to which Cambodia is a party.24 However, both the
18. The Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights maintains an up-to-date list of
the countries that have ratified the Torture Convention and their reservations, if any, to the treaty, available
at http'//www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/9.htmn
19. Office ofthe United Nations High Comm'r for Human Rights, Ratifications and Reservations,
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
httpA/www2.ohchr.org/enOishvbodies/ratification/9.htm (last modified Oct. 2,2007) (last visited Mar. 18,
2008) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
20. The Special Rapporteur, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Question of the Human
Rights ofAll Persons Subjected to Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, in Particular: Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 590-91, delivered to the Commission
on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/26 (Dec. 15,1992).
21. See J. HERMAN BuRGERs & HANS DANELIuS, THE UNTED NATIONS CONvENTION AGAINST
TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST ToRTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR
DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNiSHMENT 148 (1988).
22. See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text
23. See EXTRAORDNARY CHAMBERS IN THE Cis. OF CAMBODIA INTERNAL R. 87, available at
http./www.eccc.govJch/ngfish/cabinet/filesfrs ECCCIRsEnglish2007_0 12.pdflastvisited Jan. 6,
2008) ("'he Chamber shall give the same consideration to confessions as to other forms of evidence.").
24. International and hybrid war crimes tribunals, like other international organizations, have
international legal personality, which provides them "the capacity to enter into agreements with other
international persons governed by international law; privileges and immunities; and an autonomous will
distinct from that of [their] members." Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on
Immunity from Jurisdiction, 41 (b) (May 31,2004), available at httpJwww.sc-sl.org/doumets/SCSL-
03-01-I-059.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2008) (concluding that the Special Court for Siera Leone has
international legal personality). SeegeneraIlyJANNEEuAEnNIMANTHECONEprOFINERNATIONAL
LEGAL PERSONALITY: AN INQUIRY INO THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF INrERNATIONAL LAW (2004);
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Agreement between Cambodia and the United Nations, which authorizes the
Tribunal, and the Cambodian domestic statute, which establishes it, contain
provisions requiring the Chambers of the Cambodia Tribunal to "exercise their
jurisdiction in accordance with international standards of justice., 2 5 These
standards arguably include the rule prohibiting the admission of torture
evidence. Moreover, Article 31 (3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties provides that when interpreting a treaty, a party shall take into
consideration, "together with the context, any relevant rules of international law
applicable in the relations between the parties,, 26 which would include the
Torture Convention. At the very least, the Cambodia Tribunal would not want
to be perceived as flouting the proscriptions of the Torture Convention, as this
would erode its legitimacy and international support.
B. The Importance of the Tuol Sleng Evidence
To enable the reader to comprehend the significance of the Tuol Sleng
evidence, which lies at the heart of this case study on whether there should be
exceptions to the torture exclusionary rule, this subpart provides background
about the atrocities committed by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia in general,
and at Tuol Sleng in particular.
In April 1975, after a protracted guerilla campaign, the Khmer Rouge, led
by Pol Pot, captured Phnom Penh and consolidated its control over the whole of
Cambodia. 7 Immediately after completing its takeover of Cambodia, the
Khmer Rouge emptied the cities into the countryside in its quest to transform
Cambodia into a completely agrarian communist state.28 The Khmer Rouge then
Manuel Rama-Montaldo, International Legal Personality and Implied Powers of International
Organizations, 1970 BRrr. Y.B.INT'LL. 111, 123, 139-40.
25. Agreement Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law ofCrmes ConinittedDuring
the Period of Democratic Kampuchea art. 12(2), U.N.-Cambodia, June 6, 2003, http://www.
eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/agreement/5/agreement betweenUN andRGC.pdf (last visited Jan. 6,
2008) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary
Chambers art. 33, NS/RKM/1004/006 (2004) (Cambodia), available at http/www.eccc.gov.kh/
english/cabinet/law/4/KR law as amended 27 Oct 2004_Eng.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2008) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
26. Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,8 I.L.M.
679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
27. Andy Carvin, The End of Cambodia; The Beginning of a Nightmare (1999), http://
www.edwebproject.org/sideshow/history/end.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2007) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
28. Ben Kieman, External and Indigenous Sources of Khmer Rouge Ideology, in THE THIRD
INDocHNAWAR: CONFUCTrBETWEENCHNAVIETNAMANDCAMBODiA, 1972-79, at 187,190-91 (Odd
Ame Westad & Sophie Quinn-Judge eds., 2006).
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persecuted and murdered many of the deported townspeople (referred to as "the
new people"), who tended to be more educated than the peasantry.29 The Khmer
Rouge also expelled 150,000 Vietnamese residents from Cambodia,3 ° killed all
10,000 who remained and carried out a larger, if less systematic, genocidal
campaign against the country's Chinese and Muslim minorities.3'
During Pol Pot's four-year reign of terror, the Khmer Rouge regime
caused the deaths of approximately 1.7 million people in Cambodia.3 2 This
number represents a full fifth of Cambodia's pre-1975 population.33 At the
same time as Cambodia's rice fields were being converted into the killing fields
for hundreds of thousands of Cambodians, political prisoners and their families
were meeting a terrible fate inside Khmer Rouge interrogation centers, where
between 500,000 and 1 million Cambodians were tortured to death or
executed.34 The most infamous of the Khmer Rouge's interrogation centers
"codenamed S-21, was located in the abandoned suburban Phnom Penh high
school of Tuol Sleng ('hill of the poisoned tree').,
35
Many of those executed within the Khmer Rouge's interrogation centers
were members of the Khmer Rouge regime itself.36 In 1976, Pol Pot and
members of the Khmer Rouge Central Committee became convinced that a vast
conspiracy against their leadership existed within the lower levels of Khmer
leadership and rank and file.37 The Central Committee subsequently adopted a
policy of interrogating anyone not above suspicion, and executed all those
29. Id. at 190.
30. Sophie Quinn-Judge, The Third Indochina War: Chronology of Events from 1972 to
1979, in THE TIRD INDOCHINA WAR, supra note 28, app. 1, at 231.
31. Kiernan, supra note 28, at 189-90.
32. S21: THE KHMER ROUGE KILLING MACHINE (Institut National de l'Audiovisuel 2003);
see also Sophie Quinn-Judge, Victory on the Battlefield; Isolation in Asia: Vietnam's
Cambodia Decade, 1979-1989, in THE THIRD INDOCHINA WAR, supra note 28, at 207,207-08.
33. S21, supra note 32.
34. STEPHEN HEDER wITH BRIAN D. TITTEMORE, SEVEN CANDIDATES FOR PROSECUTION:
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE CRIMES OF THE KHMER ROUGE 7 (2001), available at
http://www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/khmerrouge.pdf?rd=l (last visited Jan. 6, 2008).
35. S21, supra note 32.
36. See HEDER wITH TITIEMORE, supra note 34, at 7 n.2 (noting that Khmer Rouge
members who were convicted of treason were also subjected to the atrocities of torture).
37. See id. at 26 (explaining that the controlling officials of the Khmer Rouge ordered the
execution of any person within the party who could be compelled to confess to serving as an
enemy secret agent).
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within the party "found" to have been involved in this conspiracy.38 Tuol Sleng
became the central location for implementation of this policy.
39
Tuol Sleng quickly earned a dark reputation for stunning brutality. The
sole purpose of Tuol Sleng was to extract confessions from political prisoners,
who were then executed and buried in mass graves outside of the capital near
the farming village of Choeung Ek.40 Prisoners interrogated at Tuol Sleng were
chained to iron beds, where they were tortured using electric shocks, water
treatment, scorpions, beatings, and whippings. 4 1 During the Khmer Rouge rule,
some 17,000 people were interrogated and killed at Tuol Sleng/Choeung Ek.42
The Khmer Rouge regime was peculiar among revolutionary governments
in that, beyond its constitution, the regime issued no decrees and passed no
laws.43 This reticence to document its orders, decisions, and command
hierarchy is emblematic "of the fact that the Khmer Rouge leadership
intentionally kept its members as well as their individual responsibilities veiled
in a shroud of secrecy. As one Khmer Rouge leader reportedly proclaimed:
"[T]hrough secrecy ... we [can] be masters of the situation and win victory
over the enemy, who cannot find out who is who." 44 Because of the Khmer
Rouge's policy of intense secrecy, the identities of the Khmer Rouge
leadership, as well as individual culpability for the regime's crimes, have been
obscured.45
The little documentation that the Khmer Rouge produced, which would
have tied individuals to the regime's crimes, the Khmer Rouge burned as they
retreated from Phnom Penh in the face of Vietnam's 1979 invasion.46 There
was one exception: The extensive archives of Tuol Sleng were captured
38. See id. (noting that top officials took action to quell a widespread conspiracy against
the leadership).
39. Id.
40. See John D. Ciorciari with Youk Chhang, Documenting the Crimes of Democratic
Kampuchea, in BRINGING THE KHMER ROUGE TO JUSTICE: PROSECUTING MASS VIOLENCE
BEFORE THE CAMBODIAN COURTS 221, 275 (Jaya Ramji & Beth Van Schaack eds., 2005)
(describing the killing fields of Choeung Ek and the process used to effectuate the mass
executions).
41. See Donovan, supra note 2, at 551 n. 1 (describing the torture methods used at Tuol
Sleng).
42. See id. (noting that the Khmer Rouge's own records indicate that 20,000 individuals
were killed at Tuol Sleng).
43. Timothy Carney, The Organization ofPower, in CAMBODIA 1975-1978: RENDEZVOUS
wiTH DEATH 79, 79 (Karl D. Jackson ed., 1989).
44. Ciorciari with Chhang, supra note 40, at 224-25.
45. See id. (describing the difficulty of collecting evidence from diverse locations and
sources necessary to provide documentation of the Khmer Rouge's crimes).
46. Id.
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intact.4 7 In a 1999 interview, Kaing Guek Eav, also known as Duch
(pronounced "Doik"), the Khmer Rouge's security chief who oversaw the
operation of Tuol Sleng, explained that he had not been informed that the
Vietnamese were on the verge of taking Phnom Penh, and thus had no time to
destroy the records of the torture committed at Tuol Sleng.48
Among the documents that Duch failed to destroy were the testimonial
biographies of each of the prisoners who were interrogated at Tuol Sleng.49
These biographies are the primary source of information from which scholars
have been able to construct a detailed understanding of the command structure
of the Khmer Rouge. 50 Before being questioned about their loyalty, prisoners
were asked preliminary questions about where they worked, who served as their
superiors and subordinates, and what their job entailed. 51 In the absence of
documentary evidence or witness testimony linking the Khmer Rouge
defendants to particular atrocities, the Tuol Sleng evidence is critical for their
successful prosecution before the Cambodia Tribunal, which is set to
commence in 2008.52
Il. An Analysis of Three Possible Grounds for Admitting the Tuol Sleng
Evidence
A. An Exception for Preliminary Questions
At Tuol Sleng, Khmer Rouge members were forcibly brought to a place
widely known as a torture facility. The biographical information the Cambodia
Tribunal is interested in, however, was obtained from the victims immediately
47. See id. (noting the discovery in 1979 of documents from Tuol Sleng, including the
confessions and biographies of members of the Communist Party of Kampuchea).
48. Id.
49. See id. at 228 (explaining that officials wrote down biographical information for each
prisoner entering S-21).
50. Id.
51. Upon arrival at Tuol Sleng, prisoners were photographed and required to give detailed
biographical information. These statements were tape recorded and then transcribed by the
interrogators. After that, the prisoners were forced to strip to their underwear, and their
possessions were confiscated. The prisoners were then taken to cells and shackled to the walls
or concrete floor. Within two or three days, they were subject to interrogation accompanied by
torture, sometimes committed over a period of weeks. Discussion with Craig Etcheson &
Stephen Heder, Advisors, Office of the Prosecutor of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts
of Cambodia, in Phnom Penh, Cambodia (Oct. 24, 2006).
52. See HEDER WITH TITrEMORE, supra note 34, at 5 (suggesting that the archival evidence
establishes a prima facie case against seven of the Khmer Rouge officials).
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before, rather than during, the actual torture sessions. 53 As indicated above,
these statements consisted of background information such as the name and age
of the person questioned, location and type of work they did for the regime, as
well as the names and the responsibilities of their superiors and subordinates.
The Tribunal is not interested in the substantive statements made by the
detainees during actual physical torture.54 Because many of the 17,000 people
interrogated at Tuol Sleng ended up "admitting" that they were a traitor or a
CIA/Vietnamese/Soviet spy, those confessional statements are obviously
unreliable. 55 The preliminary biographical statements made as to the command
structure of the Khmer Rouge, on the other hand, are in no way self-
incriminatory and tend to corroborate one another to a high degree, suggesting
that this information is highly reliable and probative.
That the preliminary biographical information might be reliable, however,
does not mean that that the statements were not the product of offenses under
the Torture Convention. As victims were led into the blood-stained rooms of
Tuol Sleng and asked these preliminary questions, they knew that certain pain,
suffering, and likely death would follow. Anyone who visits Tuol Sleng, as this
author did in 2006, can attest to the overpoweringly coercive and oppressive
atmosphere of the setting. On the other hand, the Torture Convention
recognizes a spectrum of abusive interrogation, ranging from cruel, inhuman,
and degrading treatment on one side to outright torture on the other. While the
Convention prohibits both types of abuses, the distinction between the two is
important, as the Convention's exclusionary rule by its terms only applies to the
latter, a point recently highlighted by England's highest court in A & Others v.
Secretary of State for the Home Department.
56
53. See supra note 51 (discussing the interrogation of prisoners at Tuol Sleng).
54. Id.
55. See HEDER WITH TITEMORE, supra note 34, at 27-29 (noting the unreliable nature of
these tortured confessions).
56. A & Others v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't [2005] UKHL 71, [2006] 2 A.C. 221
(appeal taken from E.W.C.A.) (U.K.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld
200506/ldjudgnt/jdO51208/aand.pdf (last visited Jan. 7,2008). In this case, the House of Lords
unanimously overturned a two-to-one ruling of the court of appeal that had held that
information obtained by agents of another country through torture where there was no British
government involvement was admissible in detention proceedings before the Special
Immigration Appeals Commission involving Algerians suspected of involvement in terrorism.
Id. 1 (opinion of Lord Bingham). The Law Lords held that once the petitioner advances a
plausible reason to suspect that the evidence in question was obtained by torture, the
Commission must exclude the evidence "if it is established, by means of diligent enquiries into
the sources that it is practicable to carry out and on a balance of probabilities, that the
information.., was obtained by torture." Id. 121 (opinion of Lord Hope).
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1. Torture Versus Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment
The preliminary biographical information from the Tuol Sleng
interrogations resulted from psychological pressure immediately before
obvious physical abuse was going to commence. The principle question here
is whether the knowledge that actual physical torture was about to begin is of
sufficient gravity to constitute the level of mental pain and suffering that
constitutes torture, thus triggering the Torture Convention's exclusionary
rule. The Torture Convention defines "torture" as an act that is intentionally
inflicted on a person by which severe pain or suffering, either physical or
mental, is used to obtain information from that person.
57
The leading case focusing on the distinction between torture and cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment is Ireland v. United Kingdom,58 decided by
the European Court of Human Rights in 1978. In that case, the European
Court found that the five techniques in question (wall standing, hooding,
subjection to noise, deprivation of sleep, and reduced diet) constituted cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment, but did not rise to the level of torture
under the European Convention. 9 In subsequent cases, the European Court
for Human Rights has been extremely reluctant to attach what it calls the
"special stigma to deliberate inhuman treatments causing very serious and
cruel suffering 6° which accompanies a finding of torture.6' In Soering v.
57. Torture Convention, supra note 4, art. 1. The Torture Convention's full definition
follows:
[T]orture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from
him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a
third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or
coercing from him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of
any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or
incidental to lawful sanctions.
Id.
58. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 162 (1978) (drawing the
distinction between inhumane interrogation techniques and torture, noting that actions
characterized as torture must meet "a minimum level of severity").
59. See id. at 67 (concluding that, although the five techniques extracted confessions and
other information, they did not induce suffering or cruelty rising to the level of torture).
60. Id. at 66.
61. See, e.g., Selmouni v. France, 1999-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 149, 183 (finding the requisite
stigma in a case in which French police had severely beaten and raped a criminal suspect,
concluding that this treatment was "particularly serious and cruel"); see also Aydin v. Turkey
(No. 50), 1997-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1866, 1891-92 (noting that a finding of torture is reserved for
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United Kingdom,62 for example, the court determined that waiting on death
row with the ever-present specter of death hanging over one's head created
"mounting anguish" constituting cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, but
did not amount to torture.63 If the fear of impending death at issue in Soering is
viewed as analogous to that with which the Tuol Sleng detainees were faced
during their preliminary questioning, then the biographical information
obtained from the Tuol Sleng detainees would not be barred by the Torture
Convention's exclusionary rule.
In more recent cases, however, the European Court of Human Rights
appears to have lowered its very high threshold for finding "torture." Thus, in
the 1996 case of Aksoy v. Turkey,64 the European Court determined that
subjecting the accused to prolonged hanging by the arms, which resulted in
temporary paralysis of both arms, constituted torture; 65 in the 1997 case of
Aydin v. Turkey,66 the European Court found that rape by an official during
incarceration constituted torture;67 and in the 1999 case of Selmouni v.
France,68 the European Court found that blows to the body, sexual humiliation,
and threats of bodily harm with a blowtorch constituted torture.69 In making
these determinations, the European Court stated that the European Convention
(which contains the same definition of torture as the Torture Convention) was a
"living instrument" and that the Ireland v. United Kingdom severity test must
be adapted to reflect contemporary understanding and evolution of the law.70
Also relevant is the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, which has applied a lower threshold for finding torture than the
"deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering").
62. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 92 (1989) (holding that the
undue delay a death row inmate experiences while awaiting execution amounts to cruel and
inhuman punishment).
63. Id.
64. See Aksoy v. Turkey (No. 26), 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2260,2282-83 (concluding that
treatment that is deliberately inflicted with the aim of obtaining information and that results in
severe pain amounts to torture).
65. Id.
66. Aydin, 1997-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1892 (concluding that rape, in certain circumstances,
can amount to torture).
67. See id. at 1891-92 (noting that the act of rape leaves psychological scars on a victim
that do not fade as quickly as scars from other physical and mental violence).
68. See Selmouni v. France, 1999-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 149, 182-83 (finding that the sustained
beating of a criminal suspect over a period of days constituted torture under the European
Convention on Human Rights).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 183.
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European Court of Human Rights did in Ireland v. United Kingdom. It has
found the following measures to constitute torture:
[P]rolonged incommunicado detention; keeping detainees hooded and
naked in cells; interrogating them under the drug pentothal; ... holding a
person's head in water until the point of drowning; standing or walking on
top of individuals; cutting with pieces of broken glass; putting a hood over
a person's head and burning him or her with lighted cigarettes; rape; mock
burials, mock executions, beatings, deprivation of food and water;...
threats of removal of body parts; and death threats.7
The U.N. Human Rights Committee has found similar acts or conduct to
constitute torture, including "electric shocks, and mock executions, forcing
prisoners to remain standing for extremely long periods of time, and holding
persons incommunicado for more than three months while keeping that person
blindfolded with hands tied together, resulting in limb paralysis, leg injuries,
substantial weight loss, and eye infection. 72 The U.N. Special Rapporteur on
Torture has listed several acts determined to be torture, including beating;
extraction of nails or teeth; bums; electric shocks; suspension; suffocation;
exposure to excessive light or noise; sexual aggression; prolonged denial of rest
or sleep, food, sufficient hygiene, or medical assistance; total isolation and
sensory deprivation; and simulated executions.73
While the trend in the case law of human rights bodies reflects a lowering
of the threshold for finding torture, it remains unclear whether preliminary
questions asked prior to the commencement of a torture session would meet
even the reduced standard, unless death was explicitly or implicitly threatened
during the preliminary questioning.
2. An Analogy to the Booking Questions Exception Under the Miranda Rule
The Torture Convention's exclusionary rule was designed to prevent
torture-induced confessions or other substantive information from being used in
judicial proceedings. In distinguishing the biographical information elicited
from the Tuol Sleng detainees from their subsequent torture-induced
statements, an analogy might be made to the "booking questions" exception
under the American Miranda Rule.
71. Robert K. Goldman, Trivializing Torture: The Office of Legal Counsel's 2002
Opinion Letter and International Law Against Torture, 12 HuM. RTS. BRIEF 1, 2-3 (2004).
72. Id. at 3.
73. See id. (noting the U.N. Special Rapporteur's findings).
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The Supreme Court's opinion in Miranda v. Arizona7 4 established the
basic guidelines for protecting a suspect's rights by requiring certain procedural
safeguards during a custodial interrogation.7" Similar to the exclusionary rule
of the Torture Convention, in the United States, statements made in violation of
the Miranda safeguards are deemed inadmissible in court.76 The Miranda rule
applies when a person in custody is subjected to either "express questioning or
its functional equivalent. 7 7 The functional equivalent to express questioning
refers to "any words or actions on the part of the police ... that the police
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect.
7 8
Notably, courts in the United States have determined that the Miranda rule
does not apply to information gained from "routine" booking questions.79 Such
questions involve requesting information for basic identification purposes to
secure the "biographical data necessary to complete booking"80 of the accused
regardless of whether it occurred during custodial interrogation. 8' U.S. courts
have distinguished questions intended to elicit mere biographical data from
lines of questioning intended to yield substantive evidence.
82
Similarly, the Tuol Sleng statements which the Cambodia Tribunal is
interested in using were elicited at an early stage of the interrogations and are
biographical in nature. The interrogators' preliminary questions were not
intended to establish the guilt or innocence of those being interrogated, but
74. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that criminal suspects
must be informed of certain constitutional rights, including the right to counsel and the right
against self-incrimination, prior to police interrogation).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 476; see also Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 590 (1990) (suppressing a
criminal defendant's statements on grounds that he was not informed of his Miranda rights until
after the police interrogation ended).
77. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980).
78. Id. at 301.
79. See United States v. Sims, 719 F.2d 375, 378 (1 1th Cir. 1983) ("We have held that
requesting 'routing' information for booking purposes is not an interrogation under Miranda,
even though that information turns out to be incriminating.").
80. United States v. Horton, 873 F.2d 180, 181 n.2 (8th Cir. 1989).
81. See United States v. McLaughlin, 777 F.2d 388, 391 (8th Cir. 1985) ("[N]ot all
government inquiries to a suspect in custody constitute interrogation and therefore need be
preceded by Miranda warnings.").
82. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 602 n.14 (1990) ("[R]ecognizing a
'booking exception' to Miranda does not mean, of course, that any question asked during the
booking process falls within that exception. Without obtaining a waiver of the suspect's
Miranda rights, the police may not ask questions, even during booking, that are designed to
elicit incriminatory admissions.").
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rather were merely an attempt to gain basic background information. The
analogy is not perfect, however, because evidence about the command structure
of the Khmer Rouge may cross the line from processing information used to
identify the detainee, to substantive testimonial evidence because it discloses
the names of the detainee's superiors and colleagues.
3. Should the Exclusionary Rule Apply to Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading
Treatment As Well As Torture?
The original draft of the Torture Convention provided that "[e]ach State
Party shall ensure that any statement which is established to have been made as
a result of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
shall not be invoked as evidence against the person concerned or against any
other persons in any proceedings.0 3 However, at the suggestion of the United
Kingdom, Austria, and the United States, the final text of what would become
Article 15 of the Convention was substantially narrowed, by deleting the
phrase "or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment," and inserting the
phrase "except against a person accused of obtaining that statement by
torture. , 84
Although the final wording of Article 15 mentions only evidence obtained
by torture, and not evidence procured by cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment, the United Nations subsequently expanded the scope of the
exclusionary rule through The Body of Principles for the Protection of All
Persons Under Any Form ofDetention or Imprisonment, which was approved
by the U.N. General Assembly and adopted by the Eighth U.N. Congress on the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in September 1990.85
Principle 16 requires prosecutors to refuse to use as evidence statements
obtained by torture or other ill treatment except in proceedings against those
who are accused of using such means.8 6
83. Comm'n on Human Rights, Report on the Thirty-Fifth Session, 12, U.N. Doc.
E/1979/36 (Feb. 12-Mar. 16, 1979); see also BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 21, at 205-06
(discussing the original draft of the Torture Convention).
84. Revised Draft Convention submitted by Sweden U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/WG. 1/WP.1
(1979); see also BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 21, at 212 (noting Sweden's support for the
amended language).
85. Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders, Havana, Cuba, Aug. 27-Sept. 7, 1990, 3.C.26, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 144/28/Rev.1
(1991).
86. Id. 3.C.26 annex 16. The Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors are also available
at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/prosecutors.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2008) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Four years later, when the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia was established, the judges adopted a rule rendering inadmissible
evidence "obtained directly or indirectly by means which constitute a serious
violation of internationally protected human rights" 87-a phrase broad enough
to apply to both torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. The rule
was amended in 1995, and currently reads: "No evidence shall be admissible if
obtained by methods which cast substantial doubt on its reliability or if its
admission is antithetical to, and would seriously damage, the integrity of the
proceedings." 88 According to the Tribunal's Second Annual Report,
The amendment to rule 95, which was made on the basis of proposals from
the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States, puts parties
on notice that although a Trial Chamber is not bound by national rules of
evidence, it will refuse to admit evidence-no matter how probative-if it
was obtained by improper means.
89
Subsequently, similar provisions were included in the rules governing the
proceedings of the Rwanda Tribunal,90 the Special Court for Sierra Leone,91 the
East Timor Tribunal,92 and the International Criminal Court.93
87. INT'L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YuGo. R. P. & EViD. 95, U.N. Doc.
IT/32/Rev. 1 (1994).
88. INT'L CRiM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YuGo. R. P. & EVID. 95, U.N. Doc.
IT/32/Rev.40 (2007).
89. The Secretary-General, Note of the Secretary-General Transmitting the Report of the
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since
1991, 26 n.9, delivered to the Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
S/1995/728, A/50/365 (Aug. 23, 1995).
90. INT'L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA R. P. & EVID. 95, U.N. Doc. ITR/3/Rev. 1 (June
29, 1995) ("Exclusion of Evidence on the Grounds of the Means by which it was Obtained-No
evidence shall be admissible if obtained by methods which cast substantial doubt on its
reliability or if its admission is antithetical to, and would seriously damage, the integrity of the
proceedings.").
91. SPECIAL CT. OF SIERRA LEONE R. P. & EVID. 95 ("No evidence shall be admitted if its
admission would bring the administration ofjustice into serious disrepute.").
92. TRANSITIONAL R. CRIM. P. 34.2, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/30 (Sept. 25,2000).
Rule 34.2 states:
The Court may exclude any evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial effect, or is unnecessarily cumulative with other
evidence. No evidence shall be admitted if obtained by methods that cast
substantial doubt on its reliability or if its admission is antithetical to, and would
seriously damage, the integrity of the proceedings, including without limitation
evidence obtained through torture, coercion or threats to moral or physical
integrity.
Id.
93. The statute of the International Criminal Court provides:
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It is noteworthy that the Cambodia Tribunal adopted a much narrower
exclusionary rule than is present in the rules of the other war crimes tribunals. 
94
Even if it had adopted the approach of the other international war crimes
tribunals, however, it is significant that the rules of the various Tribunals do not
automatically require exclusion of evidence obtained by techniques deemed to
fall short of torture but to constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
Rather, under what one noted commentator calls "the flexibility principle,"95
the way the exclusionary rules of the other tribunals are written suggests that
the Cambodia Tribunal should examine all of the circumstances of the case
within the context of the purposes behind the exclusionary rule, including the
fact that the Tuol Sleng biographical statements are corroborative (suggesting
reliability) and are being used against the regime that committed the torture.
4. Application of the Doctrine of Necessity
Even if the Torture Convention's exclusionary rule were interpreted in
light of subsequent developments to apply not only to torture but also to cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment, the Tuol Sleng evidence might nonetheless
be admissible under the international law doctrine of"necessity." The doctrine
Evidence obtained by means of a violation of the Statute or internationally
recognized human rights shall not be admissible if: (a) The violation casts
substantial doubt on the reliability of evidence; or (b) The admission of the
evidence would be antithetical to and would seriously damage the integrity of the
proceedings.
United Nations Diplomatic Conference on Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, June 15-July 17, 1998, Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, 69(7), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998).
94. The only exclusionary rule contained in the Cambodia Tribunal's Internal Rules
provides that:
No form of inducement, physical coercion or threats thereof, whether directed
against the interviewee or others, may be used in any interview. If such
inducements, coercion or threats are used, the statements recorded shall not be
admissible as evidence before the Chambers, and the person responsible shall be
appropriately disciplined in accordance with Rules 35 to 38.
EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE CTS. OF CAMBODIA INTERNAL R. 21(3), available at
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/fileUpload/27/IntemalRulesRevision 101-02-
08 eng.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2008). This rule applies only to witness statements taken by
the personnel of the Cambodia Tribunal, and therefore is not relevant to the Tuol Sleng
statements.
95. Gideon Boas, Admissibility of Evidence Under the Rules of Procedure and Evidence
of the ICTY: Development of the 'Flexibility Principle,' in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND
EvIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK McDONALD 263,264 (Richard May et al. eds., 2001).
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is set forth in Article 33 of the International Law Commission's Draft Articles
on State Responsibility, which provides:
1. A state of necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for
precluding the wrongfulness of an act of that State not in conformity
with an international obligation of the State unless: (a) the act was
the only means of safeguarding an essential interest of the State
against a grave and imminent peril; and (b) the act did not seriously
impair an essential interest of the State toward which the obligation
existed.
2. In any case, a state of necessity may not be invoked by a State for
precluding wrongfulness: (a) if the international obligation with
which the act of the State is not in conformity arises out of a
peremptory norm of general international law; or (b) if the
international obligation with which the act of the State is not in
conformity is laid down by a treaty which, explicitly or implicitly,
excludes the possibility of invoking the state of necessity with respect
to that obligation; or (c) if the State in question has contributed to the
occurrence of the state of necessity.
96
The International Court of Justice affirmed that the doctrine of necessity, as
reflected in Article 33, constitutes customary international law in the
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case of 1997 and again in its Advisory Opinion on
Construction of a Wall in 2004.97
In the instant case, the threshold question would be whether the use of the
Tuol Sleng evidence is necessary to safeguard an essential interest. The
successful prosecution of the former Khmer Rouge leaders is seen as essential
to transitioning Cambodia to a country that respects the rule of law, to avoiding
96. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session,
U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/iilc/documentation/english/A-56 10.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2008)
[hereinafter ILC Report on 53d Session] (providing the text of the draft articles on
Responsibility of States for Intentionally Wrongful Acts, including the draft version of Article
25 on Necessity) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The final articles,
commentaries, prior drafts, and tables showing the derivation of each provision, all appear in
JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBITrY:
INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES (2002).
97. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 40 (Sept. 25)
("[T]he state of necessity is a ground recognized by customary international law .... "); Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 140-42 (July 9), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/
docket/files/131/1671 .pdf (same).
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outbreaks of vigilantism, and to deterring the commission of future atrocities in
the country. 98 These are unquestionably significant interests.
The next step is to determine whether the threat to the state's interest rises
to the level of grave and imminent peril. If the Cambodia Tribunal cannot
successfully prosecute the former Khmer Rouge leaders without the Tuol Sleng
evidence, then the entire project of establishing accountability for the Khmer
Rouge atrocities may be in imminent jeopardy.
Third, even if exclusion of the Tuol Sleng evidence threatens an essential
interest, a necessity claim will nonetheless fail unless the state had no lawful
alternative available to protect the essential interest. In other words, "the peril
must not have been escapable by any other means, even a more costly one, that
could be adopted in compliance with international obligations. "99 Investigators
have opined that there are no available witnesses or documents that can paint a
complete picture of the Khmer Rouge command hierarchy in the way the Tuol
Sleng biographies do.I°° Moreover, it is unlikely that any of the principal
defendants can be induced to provide such information through the promise of
a reduced sentence. Thus, there are no feasible alternatives to using the Tuol
Sleng evidence.
Fourth, the doctrine of necessity requires a balancing of the interests in
successfully prosecuting the Khmer Rouge leaders against the interest in
generally deterring the use of torture to obtain evidence for use in judicial
proceedings. An argument based on necessity will only succeed if the Tribunal
decides that the former outweighs the latter. As one of the members of the
British House of Lords (Britain's High Court) observed in A & Others v.
98. See G.A. Res. 57/228, U.N. Doc. A/Res/57/228 (Feb. 27, 2003) ("recognizing" that
the successful prosecution of Khmer Rouge leaders by the Cambodia Tribunal "is one of the
central elements of any effective remedy for victims of human rights violations and a key factor
in ensuring a fair and equitable justice system and, ultimately, reconciliation and stability
within" Cambodia).
99. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-Second
Session, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980), reprinted in
[ 1980] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n pt. 2, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add. 1 [hereinafter ILC
Report on 32d Session]; see also Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J.
7, 42-46 (Sept. 25) (explaining that Hungary could not invoke the doctrine of necessity because
other means were available for responding to its perceived perils).
100. See HEDER WITH TYrrEMORE, supra note 34, at 9-10 (noting the value of this
evidence); George Chigas, The Trial of the Khmer Rouge: The Role of the Tuol Sleng and
Santebal Archives, 4 HARv. AsiA Q., Winter 2000, at 44, 47, available at
http://www.asiaquarterly.com/content/view/61/40 (last visited Feb. 9, 2008) ("[T]he Santebal
documents record the regime's military and security activities throughout the country and may
well connect individual top leaders to specific crimes.") (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
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Secretary of State for the Home Department,'0 ' sometimes "the greater public
good... lies in making some use at least of the information obtained [by ill-
treatment], whether to avert public danger or to bring the guilty to justice.'
10 2
Even if all the preconditions for the necessity doctrine set forth in Article
33(1) are satisfied, the doctrine cannot be used if one of the three exceptions set
forth in Article 33(2) applies. First, the doctrine may not be invoked if doing
so would violate ajus cogens norm, an issue that will be dealt with in detail
below.10 3 Second, the doctrine is not available "if the issue of the competing
values has been previously foreclosed by a deliberate legislative choice."'
' 04
The Torture Convention provides in Article 2: "No exceptional circumstances
whatsoever, whether a state of war or threat of war, internal political instability
or any other public emergency, may be invoked as ajustification of torture."'10 5
This nonderogation clause, however, applies only to torture. While state parties
must "undertake to prevent" cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, the "no
exceptional circumstances" provision does not explicitly apply to such
conduct.'0 6 Thus, if the preliminary questioning at Tuol Sleng is deemed to be
"inhuman or degrading treatment" but not "torture," then the language of the
Convention does not foreclose reliance on the doctrine of necessity to justify
admission of the evidence.
Finally, the doctrine is inapplicable in a "case in which the State invoking
the state of necessity has, in one way or another, intentionally or by negligence,
contributed to creating the situation it wishes to invoke as justification of its
non-fulfillment of an international obligation." 107 The situation does not arise
out of any negligence of the Cambodia Tribunal's prosecutors or investigative
judges, but because the Khmer Rouge regime made it a policy not to document
its command structure, and with the exception of the Tuol Sleng biographies,
101. A & Others v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't [2005] UKHL 71, [2006] 2. A.C.
221 (appeal taken from E.W.C.A.) (U.K.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/
pa/ld200506/ldjudgmt/jd05 1208/aand.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2008).
102. Id. 160 (opinion of Lord Brown).
103. Infra notes 126-36 and accompanying text.
104. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S DRAFr ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY:
PART 1, ARTICLES 1-35, at 350 (Shabtai Rosenne ed., 1991) (providing the text of draft Article
33). Cf. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyer's Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 491 (2001)
(assuming necessity is an available defense to federal criminal charges but holding that
Congress made a determination that marijuana has no medical benefits worthy of an exception
and thus necessity was not available as a defense to distributing a controlled substance).
105. Torture Convention, supra note 4, art. 2, 2.
106. Id.
107. ILC Report on 32d Session, supra note 99, at 52.
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the Khmer Rouge regime destroyed all of the evidence that could be used to
prove command responsibility or joint criminal enterprise liability.1
08
States have cited the necessity doctrine to justify departures from various
human rights obligations in cases involving essential interests. For example, in
1995, when 50,000 Rwandan refugees and local Burundis fled to the border of
Tanzania seeking safety after gunmen attacked a refugee camp in northern
Burundi, Tanzania invoked the necessity doctrine as justification for deploying
its army to keep the refugees from crossing into Tanzania in violation of its
obligations under the Refugee Convention.109 Citing the necessity doctrine,
both Israel and the United States have used the "ticking bomb" scenario to
justify subjecting suspected terrorists to harsh interrogation techniques that fall
short of actual torture but may constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment. " If the doctrine can be used to justify the use of cruel, inhuman, or
degrading interrogation techniques in compelling circumstances, then it should
follow that it can be used to permit the admission of evidence derived from
such interrogation techniques where reliability is not in question, the evidence
is being used against the leaders of the regime that committed the brutal acts,
and there are no other means available to establish guilt.
B. An Exception for Evidence Obtained by Third Parties
Even assuming that the Tuol Sleng biographical statements were the
product of actual torture, or that the torture evidence exclusionary rule should
be read to apply to evidence obtained through cruel, inhuman, or degrading
techniques that fall short of torture, this subpart analyzes whether the evidence
should nevertheless be admitted on the grounds that the Tribunal's personnel
were not involved in the unlawful interrogations.
108. See Chigas, supra note 100, at 45 (describing the destruction of documentary
evidence by members of the Khmer Rouge).
109. See Roman Boed, State of Necessity as a Justification for Internationally Wrongful
Conduct, 3 YALE HUM. RTs. & DEV. L.J. 1, 2 (2000) ("In effect, Tanzania had invoked the
concept of'state of necessity' as an excuse for a border-closure that may have violated its duties
under international law.").
110. See Supreme Court of Israel: Judgment Concerning the Legality of the General
Security Service's Interrogation Methods, 38 I.L.M. 1471, 1485-86 (1999) (discussing the
availability of a "ticking bomb" necessity defense for investigators facing criminal charges
stemming from their use of controversial interrogation techniques); Memorandum from Jay S.
Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1,
2002), reprinted in The White House Torture Memoranda, 37 CASE W. REs. J. INT'LL. 615 app.
lxx, at 39-41 (2006). For a critique of the use of the necessity doctrine in these cases, see
Robert Goldman, supra note 7 1.
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1. The Silver Platter Doctrine
Because the exclusionary rule is based largely on the principle of deterring
the misconduct of the state's authorities, the rule has generally been applied
only when the state's authorities are themselves involved in the breach. As the
U.S. Supreme Court has said, "[i]t is well established, of course, that the
exclusionary rule, as a deterrent sanction, is not applicable where a private
party or a foreign government commits the offending act.""' This has become
known in the United States as the "international silver platter doctrine,"
'"12
which applies to evidence supplied by foreign authorities unless "the United
States agents' participation in the investigation is so substantial that the action
is a joint venture between United States and foreign officials.""1
3
There is a compelling argument for applying the silver platter doctrine to
the Cambodia Tribunal. Because the authorities seeking to use the Tuol Sleng
evidence (the international co-prosecutors) are part of a separate legal system
than the authorities that procured the statements by torture (the Khmer Rouge
regime), there is no deterrent value to excluding the evidence from proceedings
before the Cambodia Tribunal. The regime that employed torture is in no way
benefiting from its misconduct; rather, the evidence is being used against the
regime's former leaders in their prosecution by a war crimes Tribunal
established by the United Nations. 114
Moreover, application of the silver platter doctrine by the Cambodia
Tribunal would be consistent with the case law of other U.N. -established
war crimes tribunals. Although they have not dealt squarely with the
question of the admissibility of torture evidence, both the International
111. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 455 n.31 (1976).
112. See generally Warren J. Argue, Note, The New International "Silver Platter
Doctrine":" Admissibility in Federal Courts of Evidence Illegally Obtained by Foreign Officers
in a Foreign Country, 2 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 280 (1969); Stephen M. Kaplan, Comment,
The Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule in Federal Court to Evidence Seized and
Confessions Obtained in Foreign Countries, 16 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 495 (1977).
113. United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 1995).
114. Although the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) is a hybrid
tribunal rather than a purely "international tribunal," and although its name ("in the Courts of
Cambodia") might suggest that it is part of the Cambodia judicial system, like the Special Court
for Sierra Leone, it has enough international attributes to render it a distinct international
juridical institution. See Introduction to the ECCC, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/abouteccc.
htm.aspx (last visited Jan. 25, 2008) (noting that the ECCC is "a Cambodian court with
international participation that will apply international standards") (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); see also Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on
Immunity from Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber, 37-42 (May 31, 2004), available at
http://www.sc-sl.org/documents/scsl-03-01-I-059.pdf(last visited Jan. 25, 2008) (noting that the
Special Court for Sierra Leone was an international criminal tribunal).
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Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda have applied a version of the silver platter doctrine to
admit evidence obtained in violation of attorney-client privilege, through
warrantless searches, or through illegal wiretaps where the tribunals' personnel
or agents were not involved in the breaches." 5 Thus, in refusing to exclude
unlawful wiretap evidence obtained by Bosnian authorities, the Yugoslavia
Tribunal stated: "The function of this Tribunal is not to deter and punish illegal
conduct by domestic law enforcement authorities by excluding illegally
obtained evidence."
' 16
115. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, Case No. ICTR 97-21 -AR15bis, Decision on
the Defence Motion for Exclusion of Evidence and Restitution of Property Seized, 26 (Oct.
12, 2000) (rejecting a defendant's motion to exclude evidence obtained through an unlawful
search of his home by Kenyan authorities); Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR 98-44A-T,
Decision on the Defence Motion Concerning the Arbitrary Arrest and Illegal Detention of the
Accused and on the Defence Notice of Urgent Motion to Expand and Supplement the Record of
8 December 1999 Hearing, IM 34-36 (May 8, 2000) (rejecting a defendant's motion, before the
Rwanda Tribunal, to dismiss charges based on the failure of Benin authorities to present an
arrest warrant or apprise the defendant of the charges at the time of arrest); Prosecutor v.
Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR 97-19-AR72, Prosecutor's Request for Review or
Reconsideration, 74 (Mar. 31, 2000) (reversing a dismissal of charges against a defendant
because Cameroon, rather than the prosecutor, was responsible for the defendant's lengthy pre-
trial detention and for failing to inform him of the charges or afford him a right to challenge the
legality of his detention); Prosecutor v. Ngirumpatse, Case No. ICTR 98-44-I, Decision on the
Defence Motion Challenging the Lawfulness of the Arrest and Detention and Seeking Return or
Inspection of Seized Items, 56, (Dec. 10, 1999) (rejecting a defendant's motion for review of
the Trial Chamber's decision absent newly discovered facts); Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No.
ICTR 98-44-AR73, Decision on the Defence Motion for the Restitution of Documents and
Other Personal or Family Belongings Seized (Rule 40(C) of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence), and the Exclusion of Such Evidence Which May Be Used by the Prosecutor in
Preparing an Indictment Against the Applicant, 4.2 (Dec. 10, 1999) (rejecting a motion to
dismiss, before the Rwanda Tribunal, where Togo held the defendant for an excessive amount
of time before turning him over to the Tribunal); see also Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-
99-36-T, Decision on the Defence Objection to Intercept Evidence, 99 61-68 (Oct. 3, 2003)
(rejecting defendant's motion, before the Yugoslavia Tribunal, to exclude evidence obtained
through the illegal interception of telephone conversations by Bosnian authorities). But see
Prosecutor v. Delali, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on Zdravko Mucid's Motion for the
Exclusion of Evidence, TT 46-55 (Sept. 2, 1997) (holding, by the Yugoslavia Tribunal, that a
defendant's confession was inadmissible where his right to counsel was violated during an
Austrian police interrogation); accord Goran Sluiter, International Criminal Proceedings and
the Protection of Human Rights, 37 NEw ENG. L. REV. 935, 942 (2003) (criticizing application
of the silver-platter doctrine and arguing that international war crimes tribunals "must take
account of every human rights violation that occurs in the framework of the criminal
proceedings").
116. Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Decision on the Defence Objection to
Intercept Evidence, 65(9) (Oct. 3, 2003), available at http://www.un.org/icty/brdjanin/trialc/
decision-e/031003.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2008) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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Some courts, however, apply an exception to the international silver platter
doctrine where the acts of the foreign authorities shock the judicial conscience.
A leading case is United States v. Fernandez-Caro, 117 in which a U.S. federal
court found that the conduct of Mexican police "shocked the conscience"' 18
and, therefore, excluded statements that the Mexican police had obtained by
severely beating the defendant, pouring water through his nostrils while he was
bound and gagged, and applying electrical shocks to his wet body." 9 The
reason for this exception is that in addition to serving a deterrent function, the
torture evidence exclusionary rule serves an important secondary function: to
preserve the integrity of the judicial process and the honor of the judicial
system.
In deciding not to apply the silver platter doctrine to torture evidence
procured by foreign authorities in the case of A & Others v. Secretary of State
for the Home Department, the British House of Lords stressed that "the rule
must exclude statements obtained by torture anywhere, since the stain attaching
to such evidence will defile [the] court whatever the nationality of the
torturer.' 120 As two of the Law Lords in that case put it, "torture is torture
whoever does it.' 21  Yet, that is not exactly true, because the Torture
Convention does not apply to the conduct of private parties. Therefore, the
exclusionary rule cannot really be justified on the grounds that a court can
never admit torture evidence without degrading the administration of justice,
because evidence obtained from private acts of torture would not be excluded
by the Torture Convention, though using such evidence would seem to be
equally defiling.
It is also noteworthy that the defendant in Fernandez-Caro was merely
charged with immigration fraud in a domestic court12 2 and the petitioners in A
& Others were alleged to have been part of a terrorist organization by an
immigration court. 23 In contrast, international war crimes tribunals have
117. United States v. Fernandez-Caro, 677 F. Supp. 893, 895 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (granting
the defendant's motion to suppress evidence of his confession).
118. Id.
119. See id. at 894-95 (refusing to admit evidence obtained from an interrogation
conducted by foreign authorities because "the methods employed.., were too close to the rack
and screw to be acceptable").
120. A & Others v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't [2005] UKHL 71, [2006] 2 A.C.
221, 91 (opinion of Lord Bingham) (appeal taken from E.W.C.A.) (U.K.), available at
http://www.publications.parlianent.uk/pa/ld200506/ldjudgmt/jd05 i 208/aand.pdf(last visited
Jan. 25, 2008).
121. Id. 135 (opinion of Lord Bingham).
122. Fernandez-Caro, 677 F. Supp. at 894.
123. A & Others, 8-9 (opinion of Lord Bingham).
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balanced the gravity of the alleged crimes against the severity of the
mistreatment of the defendant in fashioning an appropriate remedy. Thus, in
Prosecutor v. Nikolic,124 the Appeals Chamber of the Yugoslavia Tribunal,
departing from the approach of the European Court of Human Rights and
numerous national courts, declined to dismiss a case when it was established
that individuals in collusion with the NATO-led Stabilization Force in Bosnia
had abducted and mistreated the defendant in violation of human rights law.
25
Although the Nikolic case did not deal specifically with the admission of
evidence gained by torture, by analogy, it suggests that the Cambodia Tribunal
could follow a more flexible approach in light of the fact that the defendants
have been charged with the gravest crimes known to mankind by an
international war crimes tribunal. The Tribunal could, for example, deal with
the problem of using third-party torture evidence by expressly discounting the
weight to be accorded it, rather than excluding it altogether.
2. Jus Cogens and the Torture Exclusionary Rule
The British Appeals Court found discounting the weight to be the
appropriate approach to torture evidence procured by foreign officials in A &
Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department.'26 In overturning the
appeals court decision, at least one of the Law Lords concluded that treating
torture evidence as a matter of weight rather than admissibility was foreclosed
by the jus cogens nature of the prohibition on torture.1 7  Citing the
International Court of Justice's Advisory Decision on the Legal Consequences
of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, Lord Bingham
opined that the jus cogens nature of the prohibition on torture implied that
states were under an obligation to refuse to accept any results arising from its
violation by another state.1
28
124. Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal
Concerning Legality of Arrest, 26 (June 5, 2003).
125. See id. 32 ("[T]he evidence does not satisfy the Appeals Chamber that the rights of
the accused were egregiously violated in the process of his arrest. Therefore, the procedure
adopted for his arrest did not disable the Trial Chamber from exercising its jurisdiction.").
126. A & Others v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't [2005] UKHL 71, [2006] 2 A.C. 221
(appeal taken from E.W.C.A.) (U.K.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld
200506/ldjudgmt/jd051208/aand.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2008).
127. Id. 50 (opinion of Lord Bingham).
128. Id. 33-34 (opinion of Lord Bingham). Lord Bingham states:
[The opinion] explained the consequences of the breach found in that case: "Given
the character and the importance of the rights and obligations involved, the court is
of the view that all States are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal
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Closer scrutiny, however, suggests that Lord Bingham's deduction
represents a leap in logic that is not supported by the international precedent.
To be clear, this Article fully accepts Lord Bingham's initial conclusion that the
prohibition on torture itself rises to the level ofjus cogens (a preemptory norm
that prevails over international agreements and other rules of international law
that conflict with it).' 29 Though the termjus cogens had not yet been coined,
the concept was first applied by the U.S. Military Tribunal at Nuremberg,
which declared that the treaty between Germany and Vichy France approving
the use of French prisoners of war in the German armaments industry was void
under international law as contra bonus mores (contrary to fundamental
morals).130 The debates within the U.N. International Law Commission, which
codified the jus cogens concept for the first time in the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 131 reflect the view that the phenomenon of
Nazi Germany rendered the purely contractual conception of international law
insufficient for the modem era. 132  Consequently, the International Law
situation resulting from the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem. They are also under an
obligation not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by
such construction."
Id. 34 (quoting Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 200 (July 9)).
129. See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 153 (Dec. 10,
1998) ("Because of the importance of the values it protects, [the prohibition against torture]
has evolved into a peremptory norm orjus cogens, that is, a norm that enjoys a higher rank in
the international hierarchy than treaty law and even 'ordinary' customary rules."). See
generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102 cmt. k (1987).
130. See 9 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 1395 (1950) ("[W]e have no hesitancy in reaching
the conclusion that if Laval or the Vichy ambassador to Berlin made any agreement such as
that claimed with respect to the use of French prisoners of war in German armament
production, it was manifestly contra bonus mores and hence void.").
131. Article 53 of the Vienna Convention provides:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory
norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a
peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized
by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character.
Vienna Convention, supra note 26, art. 53.
132. The U.N. International Law Commission noted:
The international society of [the nineteenth century] had been able to accept the
idea of the unlimited will of the State because it had been relatively stable. But
when a phenomenon such as Naziism appeared, the theory became questionable.
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Commission opined that a treaty designed to promote slavery or genocide, or to
prepare for aggression, "ought to be declared void.',
133
Thus, pursuant to thejus cogens concept, even states that are not party to
the Torture Convention are prohibited from committing acts of torture, and an
international agreement between states to facilitate commission of such acts
would be void ab initio. Moreover, there is growing recognition that universal
jurisdiction exists such that all states have a right to prosecute or entertain civil
suits against the perpetrators ofJus cogens crimes such as torture, even if they
are not party to the Torture Convention.' 34 Yet, this does not mean, as Lord
Bingham asserted, that the Torture Convention's exclusionary rule has itself
risen to the level of jus cogens or that the exclusion of torture evidence is
required as an essential corollary to thejus cogens prohibition of torture.
To understand the flaw in Lord Bingham's reasoning, consider that courts
have found that other procedural requirements of the Torture Convention, such
as the obligation to prosecute under Article 5 and the obligation to provide a
remedy under Article 14, have not in themselves attained jus cogens status
despite the fact that torture is ajus cogens offense. Not only have there been
numerous instances of states providing amnesty and asylum to leaders accused
of committing acts of torture when it is in the interests of peace and ending
abuses to do so, but even more telling, there have been no protests from states
when such amnesty or asylum has been offered. 135 Moreover, there has been
The contractual conception of international law, which did not recognizejus
cogens, belonged to the time when international law had been only a law for the
Great Powers. But modem international law had been universalized and socialized.
Summary Records of the 684th Meeting, [1963] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 72, 61-62, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/156 & Addenda.
133. Summary Records of the 683rd Meeting, [1963] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 63, 40,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/156 & Addenda.
134. See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985) (observing that
"[i]ntemational law recognizes a 'universal jurisdiction' over certain offenses," including crimes
against humanity and genocide); Michael P. Scharf, The ICC's Jurisdiction over the Nationals
of Non-Party States: A Critique of the US. Position, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 88-90
(2001) ("It is now widely accepted that crimes against humanity are subject to universal
jurisdiction.").
135. See Michael P. Scharf, From the eXile Files: An Essay on Trading Justice for Peace,
63 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 339, 340-47 (2006) (noting examples in recent international conflicts
where amnesty and/or exile has been traded for peace). In the years since the negotiation of the
Torture Convention, sixteen states-Angola, Argentina, Brazil, Cambodia, Chile, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Ivory Coast, Nicaragua, Peru, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo,
and Uruguay-have each, as part of a peace arrangement, granted amnesty to members of the
former regime that committed acts of torture within their respective borders. Id. at 342. In five
of these countries-Cambodia, El Salvador, Haiti, Sierra Leone, and South Africa--the United
Nations itself pushed for, helped negotiate, or endorsed the granting of amnesty as a means of
restoring peace and democratic government. Id. at 343. In addition to amnesty (which
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widespread judicial recognition that the jus cogens nature of the crime of
torture does not prevent accused perpetrators from successfully asserting head
of state immunity or sovereign immunity to avoid criminal or civil liability in
foreign courts. 13 6  Because jus cogens, as a peremptory norm, would by
definition supersede the customary international law doctrine of head of state
immunity where the two come into conflict, the only way to reconcile these
rulings is to conclude that the duty to prosecute has not attained jus cogens
status and is not required as an incidence of the jus cogens prohibition of
torture.
Because the duty to prosecute torture has not attainedjus cogens status,
logic would suggest that the exclusionary rule has not done so either. This
would be especially true when the use of the torture evidence would not
condone the torture but be used against the leaders of the regime that
committed the torture. Using the evidence in the trials of the Khmer Rouge
before the Cambodia Tribunal would not have the effect of rendering aid or
assistance to an unlawful situation, and thus would not contravene the principle
laid down by the International Court of Justice in the Advisory Decision on the
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian
Territory. 1
37
immunizes the perpetrator from domestic prosecution), exile and asylum in a foreign country
(which puts the perpetrator out of the jurisdictional reach of domestic prosecution) is often used
to induce regime change, with the blessing and involvement of significant states and the United
Nations. Id. at 343. Since the advent of the Torture Convention, Ferdinand Marcos fled the
Philippines for Hawaii; Baby Doc Duvalier fled Haiti for France; Mengisthu Haile Miriam fled
Ethiopia for Zimbabwe; Idi Amin fled Uganda for Saudi Arabia; General Raoul Cedras fled
Haiti for Panama; and Charles Taylor fled Liberia for exile in Nigeria under a deal negotiated by
the United States and U.N. envoy Jacques Klein. Id.
136. See Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 627 (7th Cir. 2004) (concluding that a violation ofjus
cogens is not an implied waiver of head of state immunity); Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239, 244 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Congress can legislate to open United
States courts to some victims of international terrorism in their suits against foreign states
without inevitably withdrawing entirely the defense of sovereign immunity for alljus cogens
violations."); Princz v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding
no statutory exceptions to the general grant of sovereign immunity under the Federal Sovereign
Immunities Act forjus cogens violations occurring during the Holocaust); Siderman de Blake v.
Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 717-19 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding that a violation ofjus
cogens does not waive sovereign immunity under U.S. law); Regina v. Bow St. Metro.
Stipendiary Magistrate, exparte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L. 1999) (U.K.)
(allowing a head of state immunity defense for crimes committed prior to the ratification of the
Torture Convention); Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J.
3, 23-25 (Feb. 14), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/1 21/8126.pdf (last visited
Jan. 25, 2008) (denying an exception to head of state immunity for war crimes or crimes against
humanity); AI-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, 100-02 (affirming state
immunity from international civil suits).
137. See A & Others v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't [2005] UKHL 71, [2006] 2 A.C.
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C. An Expanded Exception for Cases Against the Torturer
1. Canons of Statutory Construction and Principles of Treaty Interpretation
Article 15 of the Torture Convention contains a specific exception to the
general prohibition of admitting evidence obtained from torture. The exception
permits evidence gained from torture to be used "only against a person accused
of torture as evidence that the statement was made." 38 This exception was
inserted during the final stages of the negotiation of the Convention at the
urging of the United Kingdom, Austria, and the United States.139 According to
Burges and Danelius, the leading authorities on the negotiating history of the
Convention, the purpose of the exception to the exclusionary rule was "not to
prove that the statement is a true statement," but to prove that a statement was
said under torture.
40
The inclusion of this single specific exception would ordinarily trigger the
canon of statutory construction known as expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
meaning the inclusion of one thing implies the exclusion of another.' 4' In the
case of the Torture Convention, the maxim would mean that a court should
presume that because the drafters decided to include a single, specific exception
to the exclusionary rule, they must have intended to exclude all other possible
exceptions.
On its face, expressio unius supports the contention that there can be but
one narrow exception to the Torture Convention's exclusionary rule, namely
that evidence gained from torture can be used to prove the existence of torture
in a case against the torturer. The Tuol Sleng evidence would not be
admissible under this narrow exception for two reasons: First, it would be used
against high-ranking members of the Khmer Rouge regime rather than the
actual Tuol Sleng torturers; and second, it would be used to provide details
about the command structure of the Khmer Rouge regime rather than to prove
that the victims were tortured at Tuol Sleng.
However, expressio unius is limited by context, as when strict adherence
to the text in a given case will lead to an absurd or unreasonable result.
221, 134 (opinion of Lord Bingham) (appeal taken from E.W.C.A.) (U.K.), available at
http://www. publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldjudgmt/jd05l208/aand.pdf (last visited
Jan. 25, 2008) (describing this principle as the duty to "reject the fruits of torture inflicted in
breach of international law").
138. Torture Convention, supra note 4, art. XV.
139. BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 21, at 208.
140. Id.
141. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 620 (8th ed. 2004) (citing as an example "each citizen is
entitled to vote" implies that noncitizens cannot vote).
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According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 142 treaties "shall
be interpreted in good faith ... in the light of [their] object and purpose."' 43 In
the instant case, strict adherence to a literal construction of Article 15 could
convert the Torture Convention into a shield to protect high-ranking members
of the Khmer Rouge from successful prosecution for committing acts of
torture-a result that would frustrate the object and purpose of the Convention.
To avoid this unreasonable result, the limitation to the expressio unius maxim
could be used to support a broader interpretation of the exception in Article 15,
one that would permit the use of evidence of the command hierarchy obtained
by torture to be used in a case against the regime superiors who were
responsible for the policy of torture and other atrocities.
The leading case that illustrates application of the limitation to the
expressio unius maxim is Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States.144 In
Holy Trinity, an Episcopal Church in New York City petitioned the Supreme
Court to overturn its conviction for hiring an English citizen as rector, in
violation of the Alien Contract Labor Act.145 Under the Alien Contract Labor
Act, it was "unlawful for any person, company, partnership, or corporation, in
any manner whatsoever, to prepay the transportation, or in any way assist or
encourage the importation or migration of any alien or aliens, any foreigner or
foreigners, into the United States" for the purposes of labor. 146 Despite its
broad language, the actual purpose of the Alien Contract Labor Act was only to
prevent an influx of unskilled labor into the United States. 47 In overruling the
petitioner's conviction, the Supreme Court made several important points.
First, the Court noted: "[A] thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet
not within the statute, because not within its spirit nor within the intention of its
makers.' 48 Next, the Court observed: "If a literal construction of the words of
a statute be absurd, the act must be so construed as to avoid the absurdity."'
' 49
142. See generally Vienna Convention, supra note 26.
143. Id. art. XXXI.
144. See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457,465 (1892) (finding
that Congress enacted the Alien Contract Labor Act merely to avoid "the influx of... cheap,
unskilled labor" into the country).
145. Id. at 457-58. For an in-depth discussion of the case, see generally Carol Chomsky,
Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity: Spirit, Letter and History in Statutory Interpretation,
100 COLUM. L. REv. 901 (2000).
146. Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 458.
147. Id. at 464-65.
148. Id. at 459.
149. Id. at 460.
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Applying these principles-first, that a statute or treaty may contain
language that is specific and yet undermines its purpose; second, that a treaty is
to be interpreted in light of its object and purpose; and third, that literal
construction that leads to an unreasonable conclusion is to be avoided-the
exception contained in Article 15 of the Torture Convention could be
interpreted to permit admission of the Tuol Sleng evidence in order to establish
the command structure of the Khmer Rouge. If it is permissible under Article
15 to use evidence obtained through the use of torture against those that
committed the torture to prove the torture occurred, then it should also be
permissible to use the same evidence against those higher in the chain of
command who were responsible for the policies resulting in the torture,
especially where there is no other evidence available for this purpose. Rather
than undercut the deterrent function of the torture evidence exclusionary rule,
this interpretation will provide an added incentive for regimes to forego torture.
If the members of the leadership of a regime know that evidence derived
through the use of torture can be used against them, it will be a more difficult
decision for them to sanction the use of torture.
Support for this expanded interpretation of Article 15 may be found in the
subsequent practice of the members of the United Nations, consistent with
Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 150 As
mentioned above, three years after the Torture Convention entered into force,
the U.N. General Assembly approved The Body ofPrinciples for the Protection
ofA 11 Persons Under Any Form ofDetention or Imprisonment, Principle 16 of
which requires prosecutors to refuse to use as evidence statements obtained by
torture or other ill treatment except in proceedings against those who are
accused of using such means.' 5' This subsequent reformulation of the
exception to the torture evidence exclusionary rule drops the strict requirement
that the statements can only be used "as evidence that the statement was made,"
150. Vienna Convention, supra note 26, art. XXI ("There shall be taken into account,
together with the context... [a]ny subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation."). Observing that Article 31
reflects customary international law, the International Court of Justice has stated:
The importance of such subsequent practice in the application of the treaty, as an
element of interpretation, is obvious; for it constitutes objective evidence of the
understanding of the parties as to the meaning of the treaty. Recourse to it as a
means of interpretation is well-established in the jurisprudence of international
tribunals.
Kasikili/Sududu Island (Botswana v. Namibia), 1999 I.C.J. 1045, 1076 (Dec. 13).
151. Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders, supra note 85, 16.
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thus permitting the use of evidence obtained by torture for any purpose in a
case against those responsible for the torture.
2. An Analogy to the Use of Unethically Obtained Medical Data
The main argument against broadening the interpretation of Article 15 of
the Torture Convention to permit the use of torture evidence to establish
command responsibility or joint criminal enterprise liability in a case against
the leaders responsible for torture is that, as a matter of morality, a court should
never use such tainted evidence, regardless of its reliability or the public
need. 152 During the discussions at the judicial training sessions in Phnom Penh,
an analogy was drawn to the controversy over whether the data from the
infamous Nazi medical experiments during World War II could subsequently
be used to help save lives or benefit society.
53
Following World War II, twenty-three leading Nazi doctors were tried for
participating in crimes against humanity by the American Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg.154 The Nuremberg "Doctors Trial" revealed evidence of sadistic
human experiments conducted without the consent of the victims at the
Dachau, Auschwitz, Buchenwald, and Sachsenhausen concentration camps.' 55
These included freezing experiments, where subjects were forced to remain in a
tank of ice water for periods of up to three hours and then re-warmed; phosgene
gas experiments, where subjects were exposed to various concentrations of the
poison gas and then autopsied; malaria experiments, where subjects were
deliberately infected with malaria to investigate immunization procedures;
sulfanilamide experiments, where subjects were deliberately wounded, infected
with bacteria such as streptococcus, tetanus, and gangrene, and then treated
with sulfanilamide to determine its effectiveness; and typhus experiments,
152. Discussion with Investigative Judges & Prosecutors of the ECCC, Training Session,
in Phnom Penh, Cambodia (Oct. 25, 2006).
153. Id. The two situations are obviously distinct. In the Cambodian Tribunal context, the
use of the information is contrary to the intention of the torturers, whereas in the Nazi medical
context, subsequent scholarly citation and use by medical researchers is consistent with the
original purpose (the intention of the Nazis was not to inflict as much pain as possible, but
rather to obtain technically robust data not otherwise available to benefit third parties with both
military and civilian applications).
154. See JAY KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS: THE AUTHORITY OF THE
INVESTIGATOR, SUBJECT, PROFESSIONS, AND STATE IN THE HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION PROCESS
294 (1972) (reprinting United States v. Karl Brandt, 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUREMBURG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10(1948), which stated
that the crimes against humanity violated international treaties and norms of war).
155. See id. at 291 (describing the medical acts performed without consent).
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where subjects were deliberately infected with spotted fever virus. 156 The Nazi
doctors defended their actions by arguing that human experimental research
was necessary during war and that prisoners were frequently used as research
subjects around the world.55 At the conclusion of the eight-month-long trial,
the Nuremberg Tribunal rejected these defenses and convicted sixteen of the
Nazi doctors, sentencing seven to death.1
58
In addition to documenting these atrocities, the primary legacy of the
Doctors Trial has come to be known as the "Nuremberg Code"-a judicial
codification often prerequisites for the moral and legal use of human beings in
medical experiments. '5 The most important of these is the requirement of
informed and voluntary consent, which was subsequently codified in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 160 It is noteworthy,
however, that the Nuremberg Tribunal did not consider the possible future use
of Nazi medical data, and neither the Nuremberg Code nor the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights stipulate that the data from the Nazi experiments
must never be used or cited in the future. Moreover, although the prosecutor
and prosecution witnesses at Nuremberg convincingly argued that the Nazi
methods were inefficient, unscientific, and unsystematic, and that "the
experiments performed added nothing of significance to medical
knowledge," '61 in subsequent decades, researchers who have examined the Nazi
data have opined that "at least some data might provide [useful] information
unobtainable from ethical research."' 62 Since the Doctors Trial, at least forty-
156. See id. at 293-96 (explaining the various medical experiments that the Nazi doctors
carried out on the Jews and other prisoners of war).
157. Id. at 303-04.
158. Id. at 306.
159. See Benjamin Mason Meier, International Protection ofPersons Undergoing Medical
Experimentation: Protecting the Right of Informed Consent, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 513,523
(2002) (describing the "Nuremberg Code").
160. Article 7 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides: "No one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular,
no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation."
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, openedfor signature Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 16 I.L.M. 368. The International Covenant currently has 154 parties,
including Cambodia. Office of the United Nations High Comm'r for Human Rights,
Ratifications and Reservations: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/4.htm (last visited Jan. 7,2008) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
161. Meier, supra note 159, at 522.
162. See Terra Ziporyn, What the Nazis Called "Medical Research" Haunts the Scientific
Community to This Day, 263 J. AM. MED. Ass'N. 791, 791 (1990) (discussing whether the Nazi
doctors' research is worth examining); see also Peter Mostow, "Like Building on Top of
Auschwitz": On the Symbolic Meaning of Using Data from the Nazi Experiments, and on Non-
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five articles in reputable medical journals have included data from the Nazi
medical experiments. 163  According to Arthur Caplan, Director of the
Department of Medical Ethics at University of Pennsylvania, over the years the
data from the Nazi medical experiments have been "studied, cited, and
absorbed into mainstream science with little comment."'
64
The debate made front-page news, however, in 1988 when Robert Pozos,
Director of the Hypothermia Laboratory at the University of Minnesota School
of Medicine, sought to analyze for publication the Nazi doctor Sigmund
Rascher's freezing and re-warming data, which Pozos felt filled an important
void in modem hypothermia research, saying "it could advance my work in that
it takes human subjects farther than we're willing." 165 In these experiments, the
Nazi doctors, who were trying to increase the survival rates of Luftwaffe pilots
shot down over the North Sea, immersed Dachau concentration camp subjects
into vats of ice water at sub-zero temperatures. 166 As the prisoners excreted
mucus, fainted and slipped into unconsciousness, Rascher's assistants
meticulously recorded the changes in their body temperature, heart rate, muscle
response, and urine. 167 In experimenting with re-warming techniques on these
victims, Rascher documented that re-warming in hot liquids was, contrary to
the popularly accepted method of slow passive re-warming, the most efficient
means of revival. 168 When Dr. Pozos sought to republish the Nazi data in the
Use as a Form of Memorial, 10 J. L. & RELIGION 403, 417 (1993-1994) (observing that "while
it is correct to believe that the Nazi scientists were not acting ethically, to believe that therefore
they were not acting scientifically is a category mistake"). Mostow further adds: "[W]hile there
is certainly much to criticize in their scientific method.., their errors are not so fundamental as
to put them entirely outside the realm of 'science."' Id. at 417 n.53.
163. See Stephen G. Post, The Echo ofNuremberg: Nazi Data and Ethics, J. MED. ETHIcs
42, 42 (1991) (noting the abundance of literature relying on the data); see also Kristine Moe,
Should the Nazi Research Data Be Cited?, 14 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5, 6 (1984) (reporting that
Nazi data are included in several citations in articles appearing in the Journal of the American
Medical Association and the Annual Review of Physiology).
164. Arthur Caplan, The Meaning of the Holocaust for Bioethics, 19 HASTINGS CENTER
REP. 2,3 (1989).
165. See Barry Siegel, Can Evil Beget Good? Nazi Data: A Dilemma for Science, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 30, 1988, at 1 (relaying the scientist's view that the data collected from Nazi
experiments could benefit people today).
166. See David Bogod, The Nazi Hypothermia Experiments: Forbidden Data?, 59
ANAESTHESIA 1155, 1155 (2004) (describing the research conducted by the Nazi doctors).
167. See Baruch C. Cohen, The Ethics of Using Medical Data from Nazi Experiments,
JEWISH LAW ARTICLES, http://www.jlaw.com/Articles/NaziMedEx.html (last visited Oct. 15,
2007) (illustrating the pain the prisoners experienced during the experimentation) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
168. See id. (describing the results of Nazi research in this area).
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New England Journal of Medicine, however, the Journal's Editor-in-Chief,
Arnold Relman, publicly refused to publish Pozos's article. 1
69
The issue made national headlines again a year later when the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was promulgating air quality
regulations for "phosgene," a toxic gas used in the manufacture of pesticides
and plastic across the United States.' 70 The gas was also believed to be in the
arsenal of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein.17' The EPA scientists used animal
experiments to predict the effect of the gas on humans, because there was no
human data available to them.' 72 Todd Thorslund, Vice President of ICF-
Clement, an environmental consulting firm that was assisting the EPA,
suggested using the Nazi data from their experiments on fifty-two French
prisoners who were subjected to the toxic gas in an effort to develop a means of
protecting the German soldiers against chemical weapons.' 73 However, after
receiving a letter signed by twenty-two EPA scientists protesting the use of
Nazi data, the EPA Chief Administrator, Lee Thomas, decided that the agency
should not even review the records from the Nazi experiment---even if the Nazi
phosgene data could potentially have saved lives of residents living near
manufacturing plants or American troops stationed in the Persian Gulf.
74
On one hand, there are those like Arnold Relman and Lee Thomas who
believe that "[w]hen the medical profession uses Nazi data, [as] when a court of
law uses tainted evidence, legitimacy is indirectly conferred upon the manner
by which the data/evidence was acquired."'175 Analogizing the use of Nazi data
to the inadmissibility of unconstitutionally obtained evidence, Harvard Medical
School ethicist Henry Beecher stated, "this loss it seems, would be less
important than the far reaching moral loss to medicine if the data ... were to be
published."'
176
Yet, there are numerous exceptions to the American exclusionary rule,'
77
and other medical researchers say they would like to use the Nazi data, partly to
169. See id. (noting Arnold Relman's opposition).
170. See Marjorie Sun, EPA Bars Use of Nazi Data, Sci. MAG., Apr. 1, 1988, at 21, 21
(describing the EPA regulations).
171. JUDITH MILLER & LAURIE MYLROIE, SADDAM HUSSEIN AND THE CRisis IN THE GULF 163
(1990) (noting reports that Iraq produced phosgene as part of its chemical weapons program).
172. See Sun, supra note 170, at 21 (describing the EPA's reliance on animal-testing data).
173. See id. (noting the potential relevance of the Nazi data to the EPA's testing).
174. See id. (describing the ethical dilemma facing the EPA).
175. Cohen, supra note 167.
176. Henry K. Beecher, Ethics & Clinical Research, 274 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1354, 1360
(1966).
177. The U.S. Supreme Court has "carved out exceptions to the exclusionary
rule... where the introduction of reliable and probative evidence would significantly further the
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"salvage some good from the ashes."'' 78 Lawyer and medical ethicist Baruch
Cohen explains:
Although the data is morally tainted and soaked with the blood of its
victims, one cannot escape confronting the dreaded possibility that perhaps
the [Nazi] doctors... actually learned something that today could help
save lives or benefit society .... Absolute censorship of the Nazi data
does not seem proper, especially when the secrets of saving lives may lie
solely in its contents .... When the value of the Nazi data is of great value
to humanity, then the morally appropriate policy7 would be to utilize the
data, while explicitly condemning the atrocities.
In considering Cohen's proposition, one should view the issue of Nazi
medical research within the broader context of other uses of unethically
obtained medical data for the public good. For example, even as the
Nuremberg Tribunal was passing judgment on the Nazi doctors, a number of
their colleagues were being recruited by the U.S. military via "Project
Paperclip," through which the United States exploited the knowledge obtained
through Nazi medical experiments by bringing these scientists to the United
States to continue their work for government and private science facilities.8 0
The Nazis were not the only ones conducting unethical medical experiments
during the war.' 8' The Japanese conducted biological warfare experiments on
Allied prisoners at a site called Unit 731.182 Rather than prosecute these
truth-seeking function of a criminal trial and the likelihood that admissibility of such evidence
would encourage police misconduct is but a 'speculative possibility.'' James v. Illinois, 493
U.S. 307, 311 (1990). These include the impeachment exception, which allows the prosecution
to introduce illegally obtained evidence to impeach a defendant's own testimony; the
independent source doctrine, which allows the introduction of material seized in two different
ways, one of which is illegal and one of which is legal; the inevitable discovery doctrine, which
allows illegally obtained information into evidence when the prosecution can show that the
information would have been discovered legally had it not first been obtained illegally; and the
good faith exception, which allows the introduction of evidence that was seized based on a good
faith belief that proper authority was granted for the search and seizure. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 107-13, 511-15, 531-35 (4th ed.
2004).
178. Ziporyn, supra note 162, at 791.
179. Cohen, supra note 167.
180. See LINDA HUNT, SECRET AGENDA: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, NAZI
SCIENTISTS, AND PROJECT PAPERCLIP, 1945 TO 1990, at 78-93 (1991) (noting how the U.S.
military valued these scientists' research); see also TOM BOWER, THE PAPERCLIP CONSPIRACY:
THE HUNT FOR NAi SCIENTISTS 124-32 (1987) (noting the U.S. military's criteria for admitting
German scientists into the country).
181. See April A. Oliver, Human Experimentation at the Brink of Life, 9 GEO. MASON L.
REv. 1177, 1185 (2001) (noting that Germany was not alone in conducting human experiments
during World War II).
182. Id.
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medical researchers at the post-war Military Commissions in Tokyo, the U.S.
government granted them immunity in return for the data derived from their
experiments.' 83 At the same time, the Australian Armed Forces Command
conducted mustard gas and phosgene experiments on Australian soldiers to
develop effective protective gear for gas warfare. 8 4  Meanwhile, British
physicians deliberately infected Jewish refugees with malaria while interned in
refugee camps in Australia in an effort to create a vaccine to protect British
soldiers fighting on the Pacific front.1
8 5
Nor has the use of unethically obtained medical data been confined solely
to wartime. For example, from 1932 through 1972, physicians of the U.S.
Public Health Service conducted the so-called "Tuskegee Syphilis Study," in
Macon County, Alabama, involving 399 African Americans afflicted with
syphilis.18 6 Though the subjects thought they were under the medical care of
the U.S. Public Health Service, they were not informed of the nature of their
illness, that they were participating in an experiment to study the natural history
of untreated syphilis, or that a potent treatment-penicillin-was available.1
8 7
Similarly, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the United States tested new polio
vaccines on institutionalized mentally retarded children. 8 8 And in 1994, the
U.S. government acknowledged that during the Cold War, over 23,000
Americans, including prisoners and mental patients, had been involved in at
least 1,400 different studies involving nonconsensual radiation
experimentation. 89 The objective of these experiments was to measure the
biological effects of radioactive materials, including plutonium, whether
injected, ingested, or inhaled, in order to develop ways to survive nuclear
war.' 90 In the present decade, U.S. physicians have tested experimental AIDS
183. See id. (describing how some Japanese doctors received immunity in exchange for
their research data).
184. See id. (noting the Allies' experimentation on human soldiers).
185. See Elli Wohlgelemter, Report: Australian Army Experimented on Jews in WWII,
JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 20, 1999, at 1 (reporting that Jewish refugees were infected with malaria
by Allied soldiers).
186. See Jay Katz, Human Experimentation and Human Rights, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 7, 8
n.3 (1993) (describing the study).
187. Id.
188. Clifton R. Gray, "The Greater Good"... At What Cost?: How Nontherapeutic
Scientific Studies Can Now Create Viable Negligence Claims in Maryland After Grimes v.
Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc., 32 U. BALT. L. REV. 73, 78 (2002).
189. Leonard W. Schroeter, Human Experimentation, the Hanford Nuclear Site, and
Judgment at Nuremberg, 31 GONZ. L. REv. 147, 151 (1995).
190. Id. at 157.
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vaccines on "unwilling and uninformed patients" in Africa. 191 Despite criticism
that these trials violate the Nuremberg Code, the general scientific community
views AIDS vaccine research as the most likely hope for stemming the global
epidemic. 1
92
All of these cases are deplorable, and in using the data from these
unethical medical studies, the scientific community should provide more than a
simple disclaimer. Medical ethicists propose that such tainted data should only
be used "in circumstances where the scientific validity is clear and where there
is no alternative source of information." 193 Further, "the capacity to save lives
must be evident," and "citations to the data must be accompanied with the
author's condemnation of the data as a lesson in horror and as a moral
aberration in medical science.' 94 These criteria would seem to be equally
useful in the context of the admission of torture evidence in cases against
leaders accused of crimes against humanity under an expanded interpretation of
Article 15 of the Torture Convention.
IV Conclusion
Using the evidentiary challenge facing the Cambodia Tribunal as a case
study, this Article has established that there are several compelling arguments
that could be made to justify the admission of statements obtained by torture or
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment under certain circumstances that go
beyond the literal text of the narrow exception to the exclusionary rule
contained in Article 15 of the Torture Convention. The aim of this Article,
however, was not to weaken the strong protections provided by the Torture
Convention and its exclusionary rule, but instead to strengthen the Torture
Convention itself. If Article 15 of the Convention is used as a bar to the
successful prosecution of senior Khmer Rouge leaders, the purpose of the
Torture Convention will not be served, and respect for the Convention and the
Cambodia Tribunal will be eroded.
The argument against judicial recognition of a broader reading of the
exception to the Torture Convention's exclusionary rule rests on three
191. Benjamin Mason Meier, International Criminal Prosecution of Physicians: A
Critique of Professors Annas and Grodin 's Proposed International Medical Tribunal, 30 AM
J.L. & MED. 419, 439 n.79 (2004).
192. See Joanne Roman, Note, U.S. Medical Research in the Developing World. Ignoring
Nuremberg, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 441,443 (2002) (noting support for this research in
the scientific community).
193. Moe, supra note 163, at 7.
194. Cohen, supra note 167.
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assumptions: First, exclusion of evidence obtained by torture is at all times
necessary to render torture unrewarding; second, exclusion is always warranted
because evidence procured through torture is inherently unreliable; and third,
absolute exclusion is essential to protect the integrity of the judicial
proceedings. The Tuol Sleng evidence at issue in this case study provides a
severe test of those assumptions. Rather than undermine the deterrent function
of the torture evidence exclusionary rule, admission of the Tuol Sleng
biographical statements in cases against the leaders of the Khmer Rouge regime
would provide an incentive for regimes to forego torture because regime leaders
will know that evidence derived through the use of torture can be used against
them. While confessions and other incriminating evidence obtained by torture
are often unreliable, the thousands of biographical statements from the Tuol
Sleng interrogations provided a great deal of corroboration with respect to
information about the Khmer Rouge command structure and hierarchy,
suggesting a high degree of reliability for that specific use. Finally, while some
have argued that "the admission of evidence obtained through the violation of
human rights should be per se considered damaging to the integrity of the
proceedings,"'195 this case study demonstrates why it is more appropriate to
adopt a more flexible approach, taking into account such factors as the
noninvolvement of the Tribunal's personnel in the acts of ill-treatment, the fact
that the evidence would be used against the regime leaders responsible for
torture, the fact that the evidence is seen as crucial to successful prosecution,
and the fact that the case involves charges of the gravest crimes known to
humankind being tried by a tribunal established by the United Nations.
On the other hand, this Article recognizes the wisdom in the adage "great
cases, like hard cases, make bad law."' 96 There is clearly danger inherent in
judicial recognition of any of the three exceptions to the torture evidence
exclusionary rule that are examined in this Article-the exception for
preliminary biographical information, the exception for evidence obtained by
third-parties, and the exception for evidence to be used against the leaders
responsible for the torture. To paraphrase Justice Robert Jackson's dissent in
Korematsu v. United States, once judicial approval is given to an exception to a
fundamental principle of human rights, it "lies about like a loaded weapon
195. SALVATORE ZAPPALA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 81
(2003).
196. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. wrote: "Great cases like hard
cases make bad law. For great cases are called great, not by reason of their real importance in
shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest
which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment." N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S.
197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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ready for the hand of any authority" that can show an urgent need and bring
forward a plausible claim.' 97 In particular, it is likely that if the Cambodia
Tribunal applies one or more of these exceptions in justifying admission of the
Tuol Sleng evidence, the precedent will subsequently be cited with respect to
the admissibility of torture evidence in terrorism cases before military
commissions and national courts across the globe.
To avoid pernicious use of these exceptions and to ensure that they are not
applied in a manner that will undermine the purposes of the Torture
Convention in future cases, four criteria should be satisfied before a court can
consider evidence that was obtained by torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading
methods of interrogation. First, evidence obtained by torture or cruel, inhuman,
and degrading means must never be used in a trial where the victim of such
abuse is the defendant. Second, such evidence must never be used where the
prosecuting authorities were directly or indirectly involved in the acts of ill-
treatment. Third, evidence obtained through the use of such ill-treatment must
not be considered unless it meets a high level of corroboration. Fourth,
evidence derived from torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment should
not be admitted if, with reasonable efforts, the prosecution could obtain
untainted evidence that would be effective in establishing criminal liability.
The first criterion, reflecting concerns about improper compulsion,
recognizes that use of a defendant's confession which is extracted by torture or
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, would violate the defendant's right to a
fair trial. 98 In contrast, the Tuol Sleng evidence is sought for use not against
the victims of the torture but rather against the leaders of the regime that
committed the torture.
The second criterion is based on the international silver platter doctrine-a
doctrine which may be appropriate in cases involving the gravest crimes known
to mankind before international war crimes tribunals such as the Cambodia
Tribunal. This criterion recognizes that the exclusion of torture evidence will
197. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Two
years later, Justice Jackson served as Chief Prosecutor at the Nuremberg Tribunal. W.UtAM H.
REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 179-81 (2001).
198. See, e.g., Magee v. United Kingdom, 2000-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 159, 175-76 (finding that
the defendant who confessed during a forty-eight hour interrogation "should have been given
access to a solicitor at the initial stages of the interrogation as a counter weight to the
intimidating atmosphere specifically devised to sap his will and make him confess to his
interrogators"); Montgomery v. H.M. Advocate, [2003] 1 A.C. 641 (P.C.) (appeal taken from
High Court of Justiciary) (noting, in an opinion by Lord Hoffman, that "an accused who is
convicted on evidence obtained from him by torture has not had a fair trial"); see also Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936) (holding that confessions procured by means "revolting
to the sense ofjustice" could not be used to secure a conviction).
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not have a deterrent effect when the prosecuting authorities, themselves, were
in no way involved in the acts of torture. Conversely, it recognizes that when
there is involvement of the prosecuting authorities, admission of the evidence
would render the court an accomplice in the torture and defile the judicial
process.
The third criterion addresses one of the central concerns about the use of
evidence derived from torture, namely the inherent unreliability of such
evidence. In general, evidence obtained through torture is disdained, not only
because of the immorality of using torture, but also because of the fact that an
individual undergoing torture will answer in whatever manner the torturer
wants.' 99 Thus, evidence obtained from the use of torture is often factually
suspect. For this reason, evidence derived from torture must never be used
unless there are strong indicia of its reliability, such as the extensive
corroboration that exists in the case of the Tuol Sleng biographical statements.
Even then, the court should explicitly give less weight to torture-induced
statements than other types of evidence.
The fourth criterion recognizes that for moral reasons evidence obtained
from torture must be used only as a last resort, when it is critical to proving
criminal liability and there is no untainted evidence reasonably available that
would serve the same purpose. Since there is no international version of the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, 20 0 however, the investigative judges and
prosecutors may use the torture evidence to lead to other evidence that will
establish the same facts, which, if available, should be used instead of the
torture evidence.
Finally, drawing from the debate concerning citations to unethically
obtained medical data, if a tribunal or court were to admit evidence in a case
that meets these criteria, it should specifically acknowledge that the evidence
was obtained through torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, and
would ordinarily have been excluded because of concerns about reliability,
deterrence, and defiling the administration ofjustice. The Cambodia Tribunal
is poised at the cutting edge of international criminal law. By applying this
199. See A & Others v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't [2005] UKHL 71, [2006] 2 A.C.
221, 147 (opinion of Lord Carswell) (appeal taken from E.W.C.A.) (U.K.), available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldjudgmt/jd051208/aand.pdf (last visited
Jan. 25, 2008) (relating the story of Senator John McCain's experience as a POW in Vietnam).
When McCain was asked during torture to provide the names of the members of his flight
squadron, he instead listed the offensive line of the Green Bay Packers football team, "knowing
that providing them false information was sufficient to suspend the abuse." Id. (citing
NEWSWEEK, Nov. 21, 2005, at 50).
200. Id. 162 (opinion of Lord Brown) (noting that the exclusionary rule of the Torture
Convention "says nothing whatever about the fruits of the poisoned tree").
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four-part test, and by acknowledging the tainted provenance of the evidence,
the Cambodia Tribunal can simultaneously provide justice for the people of
Cambodia and fulfill the promise of the Torture Convention.
